

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8077
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/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 191
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 DAR ES SALAAM 1290

EXDIS NOFORN

E&O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG SF WA
SUBJ: NAMIBIA: AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S MEEINGS WITH SWAPO

1. SUMMARY: IN SEVERAL HOURS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL
DISCUSSIONS WITH SAM NUJOMA AND SWAPO OFFICIALS, AMB
YOUNG URGED SWAPO ACCEPTANCE OF THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL
IN ORDER TO CREATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT WITH-
DRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM NAMIBIA. ACCEPTANCE BY
SWAPO WOULD PUT IT IN A STRONG POLITICAL POSITION
WHILE COMPLETELY ALTERING THE MILITARY BALANCE. NUJOMA
AND THE OTHERS EXHIBITED STRONG SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE
WEST'S COMMITMENT TO ITS OWN PROPOSAL WHILE EXPECTING
SWAPO TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL WITH ALL ITS AMBIGUITIES
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AND IMPERFECTIONS. NUJOMA ASKED IF THE US WOULD STATE
PUBLICLY THAT IT CONSIDERS WALVIS BAY TO BE PART OF
NAMIBIA AND WOULD SUPPORT SANCTIONS IF SWAPO
ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL AND SOUTH AFRICA REJECTED IT.
END SUMMARY.

2. AMB YOUNG, TOGETHER WITH LOW AND DEPT,

USUN AND EMBASSY OFFICERS, MET MARCH 24 WITH SWAPO PRESIDENT SAM NUJOMA AND HIS DELEGATION, FIRST FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF AT THE NAMIBIA INSTITUTE, THEN FOR ABOUT TWO AND A HALF HOURS OVER LUNCH AND CONVERSATION AFTERWARDS AT THE RESIDENCE. A FURTHER HOUR OF DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY THE NAMIBIA INSTITUTE. DURING THE FIRST TWO SESSIONS, NUJOMA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GURIRAB, HAMUTENYA, MATONGA, NAUYALA AND TJIRIANGE, ALL REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE SWAPO NEGOTIATING TEAM, AS WELL AS VICE PRESIDENT NUYONGO. WE ALSO TALKED WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PETER NAYEMBA AT THE RECEPTION.

3. SAM NUJOMA OPENED THE MORNING MEETING WITH HIS STANDARD

STATEMENTS OF APPRECIATION OF USG SUPPORT AND GRATITUDE FOR THE WELCOME AND ATTENTION GIVEN HIM IN NEW YORK. AMB YOUNG THEN DESCRIBED THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT. HE SAID HE HAD COME TO LUSAKA SPECIFICALLY TO MEET WITH SWAPO BUT EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE A BARGAINING SESSION, AND HE HAD NOT COME AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FIVE. HE WAS SPEAKING SOLELY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WANTED TO DISCUSS THE BROAD POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL. HE NOTED THAT THE CONTACT GROUP IS COMPLETING REVISIONS OF THE PROPOSAL, WHICH THEY HOPED TO HAVE READY TO GIVE TO SWAPO VERY SHORTLY. HE NOTED THAT THESE REVISIONS, CONFIDENTIAL

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THOUGH IMPORTANT, DID NOT CHANGE THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL.

4. AMB YOUNG INTRODUCED HIS SUBJECT BY SAYING THAT HE BELIEVED WE WERE ENTERING A CRUCIAL PERIOD FOR THE FUTURE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE NEXT WEEKS OR MONTHS WOULD DECIDE WHETHER WE MOVE TOWARDS SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OR TOWARDS FURTHER YEARS OF WARFARE. SWAPO WOULD SHORTLY BE FACED WITH A DECISION WHICH ONLY IT COULD MAKE. IT COULD FORCE A SITUATION WHICH WOULD GIVE THE WEST THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING ABOUT THE BASIC CHANGES WHICH SWAPO WAS SEEKING. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE PROPOSAL, IF ACCEPTED, WILL GUARANTEE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL BUT 1500 SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS FROM NAMIBIA. IT WOULD LEAD TO A SUBSTITUTION OF A UN FORCE OF SOMETHING LIKE 5,000 MEN. THIS CHANGE WOULD COMPLETELY ALTER THE MILITARY SITUATION AND GIVE TO SWAPO THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHIFT EMPHASIS FROM A MILITARY TO A POLITICAL STRUGGLE, WHERE SWAPO IS MUCH STRONGER THAN SOUTH AFRICA.

(B) SWAPO SHOULD BE WILLING TO AGREE TO JUST ABOUT ANY PROPOSAL WHICH ACCOMPLISHES THIS MAIN PURPOSE. IT SHOULD

DO SO BECAUSE SWAPO, AT THIS POINT, IS STRONG, NOT WEAK,
AND BECAUSE IT WOULD GAIN WHAT IT NEEDS TO ACCOMPLISH THE
REST OF ITS OBJECTIVES.

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(C) WE ACCEPT THAT SWAPO HAS MADE SOME MAJOR CONCESSIONS,
BUT IT SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT IT IS DOING SO IN ORDER TO
GAIN A RICH COUNTRY, WHILE SOUTH AFRICA'S CONCESSIONS ARE
MADE IN ORDER TO REACH A SOLUTION WHICH WILL RESULT IN THE
LOSS OF THAT COUNTRY.

(D) IF SWAPO WERE TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL, PUTTING ASIDE
ITS OBJECTIONS TO SOME OF THE DETAILS, IT WOULD CREATE A
SITUATION IN WHICH THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO BRING ALL ITS
POWER AND AUTHORITY TO BEAR ON SOUTH AFRICA TO ACCEPT
THE AGREEMENT. WESTERN FIVE FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD SAY
TO SOUTH AFRICA THAT THE WORLD NOW BACKED THIS AGREEMENT
AND SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY REJECTING SUCH
A UNITED OPTION. IF IT DID SO, SOUTH AFRICA WOULD RECOGNIZE
THAT IT INEVITABLY WOULD RUN THE SERIOUS RISK OF IMPOSITION
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OF STRICT SANCTIONS.

(E) IN FACT, THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE BANKING ON THEIR BELIEF THAT SWAPO WILL REJECT THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL, THUS RELIEVING THEM OF THE PRESSURE WHICH IT FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE WEST WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY BRINGING UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS.

(F) SWAPO IS IN A POSITION TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AT THIS MOMENT. IF IT WAITS AND ALLOWS SOUTH AFRICA TO OPT FOR INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, THE SIUTATION WILL BE GREATLY COMPLICAEED. AS WE SAW IN THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE, AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT CONFUSES THE SIUTATION BADLY. MANY PEOPLE IN THE WEST WILL SEE IT AS PROVIDING FOR MAJORITY RULE AND OFFERING A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

5. NUJOMA ASKED FOR A NUMBER OF CLARIFICATIONS. WHEN HE REALIZED THAT THE NEW PROPOSAL WOULD NOT BE GREATLY DIFFERNT FROM THE ONE HE HAD SEEN BEFORE, HE BECAME EXERCISED AND CRITICIZED THE FIVE'S PROPOSAL AS TOO AMBIGUOUS, HE OBJECTED THAT WE HAD NOT TAKEN SWAPO'S PROPOSALS SERIOUSLY, BUT SIMPLY REJECTED THEM OUT OF HAND. THIS WAS IMPOSITION,

NOT BARGAINING. SWAPO WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A PROPOSAL WHICH WAS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE. HE WAS ANSWERABLE TO THOSE PEOPLE AND WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY AGREEMENT TO SELL OUT HIS PEOPLE.

6. AMB YOUNG REPLIED THAT EVERY WEEK WE HEAR OF SWAPO MEETINGS IN NAMIBIA BEING BROKEN UP AND INNOCENT PEOPLE BEING HURT. YOUNG CONTINUED, "YOU ARE NET SELLING OUT YOUR COUNTRY WHEN YOU ARE AGREEING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF THOUSANDS OF UN TROOPS TO PROTECTTHOSE INNOCENT PEOPLE. YOU MAY NOT LIKE ASPECTS OF EVEN THE REVISED PROPOSAL; BUT NOTHING IN THOSE PROPOSALS IS AN IMPORTANT
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AS THE FACT THAT A COUNTRY DOMINATED BY SOUTH AFRICA WILL BECOME DOMINATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS."

7. IN THE LENGTHY DISCUSSION WHICH ENSUED, SWAPO QUESTIONED THE WEST'S COMMITMENT TO THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL AND MADE KNOWN ITS SUSPICIONS OF WESTERN INTENT. BURIRAB STATED THAT THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY WHICH HE HAS WITH THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY AMB YOUNG IS THAT HE DOUBTS THE WEST'S COMMITMENT TO ITS OWN PROPOSAL. WHEN THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED IN RHODESIA, HE STATED, THE US AND UK EXHIBITED A LACK OF COMMITMENT TO THEIR OWN

PLAN. IF THE US HAD BEEN SO HESITANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN THAT SITUATION, HE ASKED WHY SWAPO SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO PRESSURE SOUTH AFRICA IN ANY MANINGFUL WAY. WHY SHOULD SWAPO BELIEVE THAT THE WEST WOULD BE WILLING TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS?

8. NUJOMA BROUGHT UP THE PROBLEM OF WALVIS BAY. SWAPO, HE SAID, INSISTS THAT WALVIS BAY IS PART OF NAMIBIA AND THAT IT WOULD FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE OF THE ENTIRE TERRITORY. IT COULD NOT AGREE TO PART OF NAMIBIA BEING ANNEXED BY SOUTH AFRICA. AMB YOUNG SAID THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THIS POSITION. WE ONLY DISAGREE THAT THE TURNOVER OF WALVIS BAY COULD BE PART OF THE PROPOSAL OR OCCUR BEFORE DECEMBER 31. IN RESPONSE TO NUJOMA'S QUESTION, YOUNG STATED FRANKLY THAT IN HIS VIEW SWAPO SHOULD ACCEPT INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT WALVIS BAY. HE EXPLAINED THE GREAT SUSPICIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN'S ABOUT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND THEIR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE SUICIDE TO GIVE UP WALVIS BAY BEFORE A RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA.

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9. HAMUTENYA DESCRIBED SWAPO'S SUSPICIONS OF THE WESTERN FIVE INTENT. THE EST ADVISED SWAPO TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL, HE SAID,BUT GAVE NO ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT WASH ITS HANDS ONCE THE TRANSITION PERIOD BEGAN. THE WEST TELLS SWAPO TO LEAVE WALVIS BAY FOR LATER, BUT DOES NOT COMMIT ITSELF TO SUPPORT SWAPO'S POSITION AT THAT LATER TIME. WHAT WAS TO PREVENT THE WEST FROM DROPPING THE ISSUE AND LEAVING AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA TO NEGOTIATE THE QUESTION ALONE WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. NUJOMA REACTED TO MENTION OF SWAPO'S EASTERN SUPPORT BY SAYING THAT IT HAD NO INTENTION OF INVITING SOVIET OR CUBAN FORCES TO FIGHT FOR NAMIBIAN FREEDOM.

10. AS THE MEETING DREW TO A CLOSE, NUJOMA ASKED POINTEDLY
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WHETHER, IF SWAPO WERE TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL, THE UNITED STATES WOULD (1) STATE PUBLICLY THAT IN ITS VIEW WALVIS BAY IS PART AND PARCEL OF NAMIBIA, AND (2) STATE PUBLICLY THAT IF SWAPO ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL AND SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT, IT WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT CHAPTER VII SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. AMB YOUNG REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT ASKING FOR A DIRECT ANSWER FROM SWAPO TO OUR QUESTIONS, NOR COULD WE GIVE SWAPO AN ANSWER TO ITS QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME. WE WOULD REFER THEM, HOWEVER, TO WASHINGTON AND SWAPO COULD EXPECT A RESPONSE.

11. THE LUNCH AND AFTERNOON MEETING COVERED MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND. WE KEPT HAMMERING AT THE POINT THAT SWAPO HAD SO MUCH TO GAIN BY ACCEPTING THE PROPOSALS. WE SUGGESTED THAT IN EXAMINING THEM SWAPO NOT FOCUS SOLELY ON DETAILS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS, BUT RATHER CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS AGAINST THE ALTERNATIVE SITUATION THEY WOULD BE FACING IN THE EVENT OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT AND RETURN TO EXCLUSIVE RELIANCE ON PURELY MILITARY CONFLICT. WE NOTED THAT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD HAD ITS MISGIVINGS AND OBJECTIONS REGARDING DETAILS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL BUT THAT THESE OBJECTIONS SEEMED LESS IMPORTANT ONCE SMITH HAD MOVED TO AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT IN SALISBURY.

12. SOME OF THE SWAPO MEMBERS SIMPLY RESPONDED WITH MORE

ACCUSATION3 OF BAD FAITH AND STATEMENTS THAT THEY HAD MADE ALL THE CONCESSIONS AND IT WAS NOW TIME FOR SOUTH AFRICA. THEY ASKED WHY WE WERE NOT PRESSURING SOUTH AFRICA TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL FIRST AND CHARGED THAT THE WEST HAD FAILED TO MOVE AGGRESSIVELY ENOUGH AND TO SUPPORT SWAPO'S
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LEGITIMACY.

13. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE SWAPO MEMBERS AT THE MEETING AND THE LUNCHEON MAINTAINED THE HARD-LINE ARGUMENTS WE HAVE HEARD FROM THEM PREVIOUSLY, WE BELIEVE THE MESSAGE GOT THROUGH. IN AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION AT THE RECEPTION, AMB YOUNG ASKED THEO-BEN GURIRAB IF WE HAD BEEN MAKING THE RIGHT POINTS AND GETTING THROUGH TO THE SWAPO MEMBERS. GURIRAB SAID HE THOUGHT WE HAD. BY THE END OF THE LUNCHEON, SAM NUJOMA HAD RETURNED TO HIS INTRANSIGENT POSITIONS, INSISTING ON FURTHER CONCESSIONS AND INVOKING HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TWO QUESTIONS HE HAD ASKED AT THE END OF THE MORING SESSION.

14. WE BELIEVE THAT SWAPO'S POSITION IS SUMMED UP BY GURIRAB'S COMMENT THAT HE DOUBTED THE WEST'S COMMITMENT TO ITS OWN PROPOSAL, AND BY NUJOMA'S QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT- IF SWAPO ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL - THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO REGARDING A STATEMENT ON THE WALVIS BAYISSUE AND ON SUPPORT FOR CHAPTER VII SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. SWAPO WANTS MANIFEST ASSURANCE OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL. SINCE A REPLY TO NUJOM'A QUESTIONS WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON SWAPO'S REACTION TO THE WESTERN FIVE PROPOSAL, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

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